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THE CONTENTS AND MECHANICS
OF RULE 23 NOTICE
RODMAN WARD, JR.*
WAYNE N. ELLIOTT**
The problems of composition and delivery of the Rule 23
notice are basic to the very utility of the class action device.
After discussion of constitutional and interpretational issues,
the authors address the mechanical difficulties of fair and
effective notice, and suggest practical guidelines for the exer-
cise of discretion by the trial court. Specifically, Messrs.
Ward and Elliott are wary of the use of the class action as a
vehicle for client solicitation, and favor close judicial supervi-
sion of all communication with the class as a particular exer-
cise of the broad discretion conferred on the trial judge by the
amended Rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
One professed purpose of amended Rule 23 is to provide a forum
for aggrieved persons whose claims are too small to warrant separate
adjudication.' Indeed, the class action has been referred to as " 'a
semi-public remedy administered by the lawyer in private practice' 2
—a cross between administrative action and private litigation."' The
notice requirement of Rule 23 presents the greatest impediment to
the fulfillment of this purpose. Subdivision (c) (2) requires individual
notice to all identifiable members of a (b) (3) class. This provision,
plus the fact that the class representative may have to bear the cost
of such notice, greatly restricts the class action's role as a semi-public
remedy. This article will analyze the Rule 23 notice requirements,
with primary focus on the mechanical problems likely to arise in the
course of litigation.4
* BA., Williams College, 1956; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1959; Member, Delaware
and American Bar Associations; Partner, Prickett, Ward, Burt & Sanders, Wilmington,
Delaware.
** A.B., Harvard College, 1964; LL.B., University of Virginia Law School, 1967;
Member, Delaware and American Bar Associations; Associate, Prickett, Ward, Burt
& Sanders, Wilmington, Delaware.
1 See Eisen v. Carlisle & 'Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Ford, Federal
Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 501 (1969).
2
 Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 684, 717 (1941).
3 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (footnote added).
4 For a discussion of Rule 23 notice in the securities area, see Comment, Adequate
Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuation of Remedies Provided
by the Securities Laws, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 889 (1968).
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II. STANDARD OF RULE 23 NOTICE
A. Requirements Enunciated in Rule 23
Although there are three categories of class actions under the
amended Rule, notice of the maintenance of the action is specifically
required only in (b) (3) actions.' According to the Rule, notice in
(b) (1) and (b) (2) actions is within the discretion of the trial judge.'
The notice provisions for the (b) (3) class are outlined in subdivision
(c) (2).
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3),
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, including indi-
vidual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that
(A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests
by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or
not, will include all members who do not request exclusion;
and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may,
if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel. (Em-
phasis added.)
Several questions immediately arise concerning the (c) (2) notice:
(1) why is there a mandatory notice provision in (b) (3) cases, and
only a discretionary notice provision in (b) (1) and (b) (2) cases?
(2) what is the "best notice practicable under the circumstances"?
(3) when is "individual notice" required? Addressing its attention to
the first question, the Advisory Committee asserts that in (b) (3) cases
notice is mandatory in order to give the class members an opportunity
to secure exclusion from the class.' Thus, the contrary notice require-
ments merely assure the class member of protection from the new
binding effect of (b)(3)-type class actions. 8
Under the new Rule, the trial judge is granted considerable dis-
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d) (2).
7 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 106-07 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Advisory Note].
8
 The (b) (3) category encompasses situations similar to those treated within the
spurious category of former Rule 23. The spurious category, however, was but a "per-
missive joinder device." See Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957). A class
member could benefit from a judgment only if he actually intervened in the action. In order
to broaden the scope of spurious type class actions, the Rules draftsmen made the (b) (3)
action binding on all class members. Since (b) (3) actions are often prone to separate
litigation, the draftsmen included in subdivision (c) (2) an escape clause wherein class
members may "opt out" of the class action. For a more complete discussion of the various
categories of class actions, see Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 539 (1969).
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cretion in his treatment of class actions.' This discretion is particularly
important to an understanding of the meaning of the phrases "best
notice practicable," and "reasonable effort" in subdivision (c) (2). It
seems that the Advisory Committee intended to leave the essential
contents of the notice to the discretion of the trial judge. The Com-
mittee did state, however, that the notice requirement adopted by the
court "need not comply with the formalities for service of process."'"
At the other extreme, the Committee asserted that the Rule's notice
provisions are "designed to fulfill requirements of due process to which
the class action procedure is of course subject."" Thus, between these
two extremes the trial judge is free to accommodate amended Rule 23
to the circumstances of the case."
Finally, when must "individual notice" be utilized? Subsection
(c) (2) states, in part, that individual notice must be sent "to all mem-
bers who can be identified through reasonable effort." Does this mean
that if a defendant corporation furnishes every class member's name,
each member must be notified individually? It could be argued that
under this interpretation, the flexibility built into (c) (2) would be
destroyed, and the "best notice practicable" and "reasonable effort"
provisions relegated to mere verbiage. But the ultimate answer to this
dilemma is not to be found in the Rule itself. To comprehend fully the
extent of the trial judge's discretion to order the "best notice prac-
ticable," one must consider the due process requirements as established
by the Supreme Court. An examination of the minimum due process
standard is also needed to determine whether any notice is required
in (b) (1) or (b) (2) actions.
B. Constitutional Requirements
In what situations does constitutional due process require notice
to be sent to the class of a pending class action? One would conclude
that while in (b) (3) actions the requirement is an absolute certainty,
it most likely exists in (b) (1) and (b) (2) actions as well. In Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin i3 the court of appeals stated that "notice is
required as a matter of due process in all representative actions, and
23 (c) (2) merely requires a particularized form of notice in 23 (b) (3)
actions."14
9 See Newberg, Orders in the Conduct of Class Actions: A Consideration of Subdivi-
sion (d), 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 577 (1969). Dissenting from the adoption of
amended Rule 23, Justice Black stated: "It seems to me that they place too much power
in the hands of the trial judges. . . ." Mr. Justice Black's Statement, 39 F.R.D. 69, 272,
274 (1966).
10 39 F.R.D. at 107. See also Z. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 231 (1950).
11 39 F.R.D. at 107.
12 Id.
13 391 F.2d 555. (2d Cir. 1968).
14 Id. at 564-65. For this proposition, Judge Medina cited the Supreme Court's
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Some commentators assert, however, that due process does not
require notice in any class actions.' One writer argues that according
to Hansberry v. Lee" the class action is a "recognized exception" to
the general constitutional rule that individual litigants must be afforded
"notice and [an] opportunity to be heard!'
We do not agree. In the first place, this reading of Hansberry con-
strues dicta; the Hans berry holding does not deal with notice, but deals
with the adequacy of representation by the named parties. Further-
more, we believe that this view has misconstrued the dicta. The Hans-
berry dicta says not that the class action is an exception to the require-
ment of notice, but rather that the class action is an exception to the
requirement for service of process." But even if Hansberry were read
as the former view suggests, the later case of Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co." would seem to foreclose the question.
The Mullane court said that reasonable notice is essential to acquire
jurisdiction in all types of actions.
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the op-
portunity to be heard." [Citation omitted.] This right to be
heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that
the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to
appear or default, acquiesce or contest.' 0
The class in Mullane consisted of numerous beneficiaries of a
bank-managed common trust fund. Presumably the questions of law
and fact in regard to each beneficiary were identical. Thus, Mullane
holds that notice is required to bind even those parties whose sub-
stantial legal and factual positions are identical. A fortiori, due
process requires notice in a 23 (b) (3) class action where common legal
and factual questions predominate over individual questions and where
the parties are less representative. It appears that the courts in Mullane
and Eisen are saying that constitutional due process requires reasonable
notice in all actions, class or otherwise, but the best possible notice in
cases where questions of law and fact may differ between the class
members and the representative quality of the named parties may be
less than certain.
decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), and the
Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23. In this regard, the Advisory Note states that the
(c) (2) notice was designed to fulfill requirements of due process "to which the class
action procedure is of course subject." 39 F.R.D. at 107.
15 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940) is often cited for this proposition.
16 Id.
17 Pomerantz, The "Notice to the Class" under the Amended Rule 23, 1968 Prac-
ticing L. Inst. 33.
15 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
10 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
20 Id. at 314.
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Rule 23, on the other hand, explicitly requires notice only in
23(b)(3) cases, presumably because the draftsmen believed that the
representative character of the named parties would be sufficient pro-
tection in (b) (1) and (2) cases." In view of Mullane and Eisen, we
doubt that it is safe to omit at least some sort of notice even in (b) (1)
and (2) cases."
III. MECHANICAL PROBLEMS WITH RULE 23 NOTICE
A. Barratry
A plaintiff, in communicating with the whole class, may seek to
recruit support both in numbers of interested class members and in
total potential recovery. Additional numerical strength may give the
case more significance. More practically, the greater the monetary
recovery by the class, the more aggregate recovery will exist from
which attorneys fees, expert fees, court costs and other litigation
expenses can be paid. This arrangement is not •necessarily evil. The
class action is "a device for vindicating claims which, taken individ-
ually, are too small to justify legal action but which are of significant
size if taken as a group."" Insofar as the notice may encourage aggre-
gation of such claims, that policy is satisfied.
How can this purpose be squared with the time-honored prohibi-
tion against barratry? Canon 28 sternly advises that "stirring up strife
and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common
law." The cure lies in the tenor of the notice. The procedure for
notice as well as its contents should lead to "accuracy and impartiality
in the substance of statements sent to class members, as well as a
general tone which will not lend itself to unseemly solicitation of
clients, or imply official approval of claims as yet untried.' Thus,
the court must consider both party's interests in the preparation and
dispatch of the Rule 23 notice.
21 See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 379-80 (1967).
22 For a more complete discussion of the constitutional issues in Rule 23, see, Corn-.
ment, Constitutional and Statutory Requirements of Notice Under Rule 23(c) (2), 10 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 571 (1969).
23 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied
sub nom. Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816 (1965) ; See also, Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 484-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) ; Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From A Judge's Point
of View, 32 Antitrust L.J. 295, 299 (1966) ; Kalven and Rosenfield, supra note 2, at 686.
24 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 28. See also, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
41 F.R.D. 147, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) ;
Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934, 936 (D. Mass. 1962); Balm
& Bland, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
25 Kaplan, supra note 21, at 398. Notice should be "neutral and objective in tone, and
should neither promote nor discourage the assertion of claims." Philadelphia Elec. Co.
v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 462 (ED. Pa. 1968).
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1. Preparation of Notice.—The first question is, who shall prepare the
notice? The court in Schaal Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc.26
 stated that the preparation of notice must be done by the court. 27
The decision rested on the ground that the court's function of preserv-
ing its impartiality demanded that it not delegate this administrative
task to an interested party." Agreeing with the Harper & Row posi-
tion, Professor Wright asserted that
[I]f I were drawing such notice as a judge I would in-
clude explicit language that this notice in no way indicates
any view of the court as to the merits of the action but is
merely to advise you of the pendency of the suit and of your
rights under it
The conclusions of the court in Harper & Row have met with con-
siderable criticism." Generally, the courts have indicated that the
mechanics of notice preparation should be performed by the plain-
tiffs.31
 The court in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co."
directed that the plaintiff prepare a form of notice to comply with
(c) (2) and present the form for the approval of the court.' It is sub-
mitted that the Brennan approach is the wiser. The representative's
attorneys should be responsible for the preparation of the notice, while
the court should reserve the right of inspection and approval, and
thereby Limit the possibility of client solicitation by the representative's
attorneys.
In addition, a class opponent may wish the notice to contain a
warning to the class members that they are subject to the burdens
ordinarily falling on parties, such as answering interrogatories," fur-
nishing documents for discovery,35
 answering requests for admissions,"
and, if unsuccessful, paying costs. 37
 Are the class members subject to
28 267 F. Supp. 1001, (ED. Pa. 1967).
27 Id. at 1005.
28
 For this proposition the court cited Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 812 (3d
Cir. 1965).
29
 Proceedings of the Twenty-ninth Annual Judicial Conference—Third Judicial
Circuit of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 437, 557, 566 (1966) (remarks of Professor
Wright).
80
 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 568 n.23 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Kaplan,
supra note 21, at 398 n.157.
81
 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 568 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Phila-
delphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 462 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ;
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 684 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
32 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
88
 Id. at 684.
34 Fed. R. Civ. P. 33.
35
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
86 Fed. R. Civ. P. 36.
37
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The class representative's attorney is probably obliged
ethically to inform the class which he seeks to represent of such costs. No notice that we
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all of these obligations? In the Brennan case;" the class action was
dismissed with prejudice as to "alleged class members" who failed
both to answer the defendant's interrogatories and to respond to a
show cause order as to why they should not be so dismissed." Basically,
however, Rule 23 is unclear as .to what extent the parties are bound
by the above mentioned obligations."
2. Sending of Notice.—Subdivision (c) (2) provides that the "court
shall direct" the notice to the class. (Emphasis added.) It could be
argued that, according to (c) (2), the court must actually send the
notice. Such an interpretation would place an extraordinarily severe
burden on the courts, and necessarily diminish the attractiveness of the
class action as a means of adjudicating multiple claims. But it could
also be argued that the (c) (2) provisions merely requires the court to
direct the class representative—who prepares the notice—to send it.
It is obvious that any notice which informs an individual of his
right of action will stir up litigation. Should the representative's attor-
ney send the notice, however, the possibility arises that he might solicit
clients, contrary to the Canons of Professional Ethics.' In Kronenberg
v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 42 the plaintiff's attorney sent a letter
along with the prescribed notice. The court criticized the action of
counsel but did not dismiss the class action because the statute of
limitations had run and "what the court is primarily concerned with
here is not the interests of the named plaintiffs and their attorneys but
the interests of the members of the class."'" Thus, in light of possible
have seen has dealt with the matter directly. The notice in Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D.
70 (D. Utah 1966), read:
If you are not excluded as a member of the class by filing of notice you will be
entitled to participate in any judgment in favor of any class or subclass of which
you may be finally held to be a member, if the suit is successful for the plain-
tiff, subject to costs; and whether successful or not, if not excluded, you will be
subject to the orders or notices with reference to the furnishing of statements or
testimony and other matters.
The notice in the Anaconda Brass case simply stated:
You will be deemed to be a party to this action, and will be included in, and
bound by, the judgment in this action, whether favorable or unfavorable, unless,
on or before November 1, 1968, you file a written election to be excluded from
the class of plaintiffs.
38 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
SO Order, August 17, 1967, furnished courtesy of G. Reddin, Esquire of the Indiana
Bar, attorney for the defendants in the Brennan case.
48 By analogy to the cases involving intervenors, an argument can be made that all
the class members who do not opt out are ipso facto parties. See Public Serv. Comm'n
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 284 F.2d 200, 203-04 (D.C. Cir. 1960); cf. Brown v. Wright,
137 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1943).
41 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 28.
42 281 F. Stipp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
43 Id, at 625-26.
563
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
abuse, the question is whether to allow the representative's attorney to
send out the notice.
The court in Harper & Row" would insist that a notice be sent
by the court. The other decisions surveyed under the amended Rule
are not explicit in the designation of who will send the notice, although
the action of the Brennan court, demanding that the plaintiff supply it
with the names and addresses of the alleged class members, raises a
strong implication that the court will sent out the notice."
It is submitted that having the notice emanate from the court—
and on the court's stationery—is the preferable procedure. "Rule 23
should not be used as a device to enable client solicitation."" Requiring
or allowing the representative to send the notice may be an invitation
to such abuse. In any event, champerty and charges of champerty
should be avoided as much as possible, and a cautionary paragraph
should be included in all notices. Such has been a common practice.
In Harris v. Jones47 the notice said:
This notice should not be interpreted as a representation that
the class actions are or are not meritorious or that the plain-
tiff or any member of the class he represents will or will not
be successful.
The notice in Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass
Co.48
 said:
This notice is not to be understood as an expression of any
opinion by this Court as to the defenses asserted by either side
in this litigation.
Some such comment sOems essential to overcome the implicit dangers
of client solicitation.
B. Payment for Notice
Neither the Rule nor the Advisory Note gives any indication of
who should pay for the notice. If the plaintiff is to bear the initial
cost, a requirement for certified mailing to each member of a very
large class may have a chilling, if not prohibitive, effect on his prose-
cution of the class suit. Judge Weinstein, in Dolgow v. Anderson,"
found that to require the plaintiffs to provide notice in that case would
"for all practical purposes, spell the immediate end of [the] liti-
gation."'
44 267 F. Supp. 1001 (ED. Pa. 1967).
45 Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp, 673, 684 (N.D. Ind.
1966).
413 Cherner V. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934, 936 (D. Mass. 1962).
47 41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966).
48 43 F.R.D. 452 (ED. Pa. 1968).
40 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
so Id, at 498.
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Most authorities believe that the plaintiff should, at least initially,'
pay for the notice. 5' This duty would apply whether the plaintiff was
the class representative or the opponent of the class. Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin" presents the equities of the payment issue. In this case
the plaintiff's claim was 70 dollars, while the estimated cost of indi-
vidual notice to the class of 3,750,000 members was 400,000 dollars. It
is highly unlikely that a plaintiff would continue with a class suit when
faced with such a cost.' The Second Circuit interpreted the Rule to
require individual notice to members of the class who could be identi-
fied through reasonable effort and concluded that if "financial con-
siderations prevent the plaintiff from furnishing individual notice to
these members, there may prove to be no alternative other than the
dismissal of the class suit."" Thus, Eisen clearly asserts that the
plaintiff must pay for the notice.
In Richland v. Cheatham' the court dismissed a class action in
which the proposed class numbered approximately 50,000 persons. In
this case the representatives were unwilling to pay for the distribution
of notice. The court remarked that this unwillingness reflected upon
the adequacy of representation and that "plaintiffs would have all
the benefits of Rule 23 without assuming any of the burdens. It is not
what the defendants insist on, but what the rule and due process
require."' The problem emerging from the decision to compel the
plaintiff to pay for notice is that in many cases where the representa-
tives are of limited financial means, the inevitable result will be a
dismissal of the claim as a class action. This result undercuts what is
presumed to be a basic justification for allowing the class action
device, the "historic mission of taking care of the smaller guy!" 5 s
51 The eventual disposition of the payment question depends on the outcome of the
litigation and the discretion of the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) ; 6 J. Moore, Federal
Practice 54.77[1] at 1346 (2d ed. 1966). Cf. Hansen v. Bradley, 114 F. Supp. 382
(D. Md. 1953), where the registered mail fee for substituted service was allowed as a
cost to the prevailing plaintiff. •
52 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 568 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Richland
v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Kaplan, supra note 21, at 398
n.157; Proceedings of the Twenty-ninth Annual Judicial Conference—Third Judicial
Circuit of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 437, 565 (1966) (remarks of Professor Wright).
But see Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) ; School Dist. of Phil.
v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001, 1004-05 (E.D. Pa. 1967). The
court in Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74 (D. Utah 1966), was unclear as to who will
pay for notice. The plaintiff prepared the notice and the court mailed it.
53 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
54 If the class suit failed, the representative would, in effect, lose the cost of the
notice because of the practical impossibility of his collecting the pro rata cost of the
notice from the class members.
55 391 F.2d 555, 570 (2d Cir. 1968).
56 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
57 Id. at 156.
58 Statement of Benjamin Kaplan, quoted in Frankel, Amended Rule 23 from a
Judge's Point of View, 32 Antitrust L.J. 295, 299 (1966).
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The court in Dolgow v. Anderson" made no final determination
regarding form or payment for. the notice. The court did, however,
present three arguments as to why the defendant, the party opposing
the class, should be compelled to promulgate and pay for the notice_
These were: "the fiduciary obligations of the corporation, the ad-
vantage to the corporation of a judgment with res judicata effects
against a class, and the ability to bear the cost." 6° Regarding the fidu-
ciary duty argument, the court concluded that in conjunction with the
two other factors it would not always be unreasonable to require the
defendant corporation to provide the notice after a prima facie case
of breach of fiduciary duty had been established. It is apparent that
the court places little weight on this argument. As for the res judicata
effect, it spoke of the defendant's interest in having all the members
of the class bound by the judgment and of the amended Rule's abolition
of "one-way intervention." This emphasis seems a bit misplaced. The
court's second argument seems to be grounded upon the probability
that the plaintiff class will prevail. The defendants certainly prefer to
avoid the class suit entirely rather than to have "all the members of
the plaintiff class bound by a judgment which is likely to be in favor
of the plaintiffs." The third argument points out that, as a practical
matter, often the burden on the defendant would not be so onerous
because the corporation has the means for addressing and mailing the
notice at hand and would require only an additional enclosure in the
next communication to shareholders. This last reason is the most sub-
stantial one, but even it is not weighty enough to counteract the
fundamental unfairness of compelling a party to act contrary to his
best interests.
One the other hand, it has been suggested that the expense of
notice could be borne initially by the court. 61
 This suggestion has little
merit, however, since it would involve a misappropriation of public
funds and would tend to give the court a stake in the outcome of the
litigation. By initially bearing the cost of notice, the court would be
making it possible for one party to proceed, when it could not have
done so before. Such an action is unprecedented and inconsistent with
any pretense of judicial impartiality.
The party desiring the notice, the plaintiff, is disturbing the status
quo, and therefore should pay for the notice. The cost of notice should
not be lessened by compromising the form of the notice in light of the
clear demands of subdivision (c) (2). The emotional reaction against
cutting off the meritorious claim of the "small guy" must be tempered
59 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
60 Id. at 498.
61
 Comment, Recovery of- Damages in Class Actions, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 768, 781
n.69 (1965).	 -
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by consideration of the interests of the thousands of non-party members
of the class whose interests must be protected. Thus, experience may
ultimately prove the wisdom of Chief Judge Lumbard's dissent in
Eisen. After discussing the practical problems involved in drafting what
would be sufficient notice and in paying for the original notice, he
concluded that the claim was totally unmanageable as a class action."
He went on to state that " [c]lass actions were not meant to cover
situations where almost everybody is a potential member of the class.""
Concluding, he suggested that it is the proper function of public
agencies to deal with defendants who have caused wrongs of such
magnitude."
IV. STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
One of the most perplexing problems with Rule 23 is that of
defining and limiting the class. To make appropriate orders, the court
must have some conception of the size of the class with which it is
dealing. The representative-plaintiff, especially, must know the magni-
tude of the class in order to determine whether the ultimate recovery
will support the attorney's fees, cost of notice and costs of appeal.
To alleviate the difficulty, some courts have required class members
to file a statement of their claims in order to preserve their right of
recovery." Such was the procedul e in the Anaconda Brass case, where
the court stated that
Din addition to meeting the requirements of 23(c)(2), the
notice should . . . include a notice that members of the class
not electing to be excluded therefrom will be required to file
proofs of claim on or before a specified date, or be forever
barred."
One commentator believes that by requiring the filing of a proof
of claim, a court is in effect rewriting the Rule to require "opting in." 87
This procedure would transform the (b) (3) action into a permissive
joinder device, and thereby resurrect the numerous problems of the
defective spurious class which the Rule's draftsmen sought to avoid.
However, as Judge Fullam points out in the Anaconda Brass case,
it is fair to state that the Rule allows for great flexibility
62 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 572.
65 See, e.g., Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 577 (D. Minn.
1968) ; Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403-04 (S.D. Iowa
1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459-60 (E.D.
Pa. 1968); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74-75 (D. Utah 1966).
66 43 F.R.D. 452, 462 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
67 Pomerantz, supra note 17.
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and that the courts are just beginning to deal with its prob-
lems . . . . For these reasons, controlling precedents are
lacking, and each case requires its own exercise of judgment."
If it is assumed that notice itself satisfies due process, no consti-
tutional prohibition works against placement of the additional burden
of filing a proof of claim by a certain date, upon members who choose
to remain in the class.
Perhaps a procedure similar to that required of bankruptcy cred-
itors could be utilized 69 Such a procedure is relatively simple, and the
forms are readily available at any federal court house.
It is important to distinguish the proof of claim requirement from
the initial notice requirement. The latter must satisfy the requirements
of due process, while the former raises a question of statutory con-
struction and judicial power. We do not agree that requiring a proof
of claim imposes judicially an "additional condition." Rule 23(d)
grants the trial judge broad powers to make appropriate orders. The
court may make orders "for the protection of the members of the
class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action . . ." (Emphasis
added.)
Thus, Rule 23 (d) (2) grants a judge power to make orders to:
(1) give notice of any step in the action, or (2) give notice of
the proposed extent of the judgment, or (3) give notice of the oppor-
tunity of members to contest adequacy of representation, to intervene
and present claims or defenses, or (4) give notice otherwise to come
into the action. It is this fourth power that may be interpreted to
allow the court, if it deems it necessary "for the fair conduct of the
action," to require class members affirmatively to "opt in" by filing a
proof of claim.
The difficulty with this approach is that requiring a judge to
determine when the "fair conduct of the action" requires opting in
imposes a test which may be nothing more than a paraphrase of the
due process requirement. After the constitutional requirement is postu-
lated away by assumption of due process notice to the class, resort is
had once more to a test suspiciously similar to due process to determine
when a judge can impose additional affirmative burdens on class mem-
bers who do not opt out.
Rather than to postulate a specific rule for every possible situation,
it is better to pursue Judge Fullam's pragmatic case-by-case approach
in the Anaconda Brass case. A procedure as helpful as that requiring
the class members to state their claims prior to a specific date certainly
should not be condemned until some class member demonstrates that
this procedure has indeed prejudiced his rights.
68 43 F.R.D. 452, 458 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
69 11 U.S.C. § 93 (1964).
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V. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the problems surrounding the contents and
mechanics of the Rule 23 notice bear heavily on the usefulness of the
class action device. The requirement of individual notice in all (b) (3)
class actions may actually undermine the utility of that subsection.
In light of the Mullane and Eisen cases, however, the conclusion
emerges that constitutional due process requires some notice in all class
actions, and the best notice possible where questions of law or fact
differ among the class members. Thus, even if the common questions
predominate in a (b) (3) instance, individual notice may be required
if some of the questions of law or fact differ.
In the preparation and dispatch of the required notices, courts
must act in order to curtail client solicitation. To limit the occurrence
of champerty, all notices to the class should be inspected and approved
by the court and should be sent on court stationery. Although the
notice is forwarded by the court, the plaintiff should bear the costs of
preparation and mailing. He is the party benefiting from the notice—
the one disturbing the status quo—and he should therefore be required
to bear the concomitant burdens.
Finally, in the administration of Rule 23 notice requirements,
trial judges must utilize the discretion given them by the Rule's drafts-
men. The trial judge is ideally positioned to determine the "best notice
practicable under the circumstances." Within the very broad sugges-
tions above, the courts must evolve more specific and sophisticated
guidelines in inevitable case-by-case efforts.
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APPENDIX: A SAMPLE RULE 23 NOTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JOHN DOE on behalf
of himself and others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.	 Civil Action No. 1000
GENERAL INDUSTRIES, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF CLASS ACTION
Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, PLEASE TAKE
NOTICE:
(a) John Doe (Doe) has brought an action in this Court against General Industries
Inc. (General) and others alleging that (brief description of cause of action)
(b) Doe alleges that he brought his action not only on behalf of himself but also on
behalf of others similarly situated, to wit: (brief description of class)
(c) The Court will exclude you from this class if you so request by mailing the at-
tached form before (date) to:
Clerk
United States District Court
11th and Market Streets
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
(d) If you do not so request exclusion, you will be bound by the judgment in this
action.
(e) If you do not so request exclusion, you may enter an appearance in this action
through your counsel.
(f) If you do not so request exclusion, you may , be subject to the obligations of
parties to a law suit such as pre-trial discovery, and if the case is lost, your pro-rata share
of court costs.
(g) If you do not so request exclusion, you will be entitled to your pro-rata share
of any recovery after the deduction of attorneys' fees and disbursements.
(h) The Court expresses no opinion as to the merits of this case.
BY ORDER OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD ROE
DISTRICT JUDGE
Clerk
Dated:
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